

Finally the Joint Chiefs of Staff representative dissented on language on an Arab-Israeli settlement in the annex, paragraph 15, subparagraphs c and d. The differing language reads as follows:

*Majority Preference*

"c. Initiative in seeking a solution to this problem would appear to be appropriate only when a sufficient common interest in the long-range stability of the areas exists on the part of the several elements concerned to enable each to press for the sacrifices or pressures necessary to make possible a genuine solution. In the absence of such common interest not even the pressures of external force would seem capable of establishing a satisfactory or lasting settlement."

"d. Initiative toward a settlement of the Arab-Israeli issue would require at least the tacit concurrence of the Soviet Union as well as of the states in the area. Within these limitations it might be possible to work toward a solution of individual outstanding issues between Israel and the Arab states."

*JCS Preference*

"c. Action to establish the boundaries of Israel and resettle the refugees, including repatriation of a substantial number, will be wholly acceptable to the parties concerned only in the unlikely event that each is willing to press for arbitration of the problem. In the absence of such common interest, a settlement can be achieved only by external pressure."

"d. The tacit concurrence of the Soviet Union would assist in the settlement of the Arab-Israeli issue."